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Abstract
This article argues that the OMC’s legitimacy can be improved only by strengthening
parliamentary channels of input-legitimacy since output-legitimacy alone is inappro-
priate and cannot be achieved without input-legitimacy. In addition, concepts and
practices of direct ‘stakeholder’ participation currently applied within the OMC are
insufficient in strengthening input-legitimacy.
Introduction
In November 2007, the open method of co-ordination (OMC) celebrated its
tenth anniversary.1 When it was initially established, the OMC was predomi-
nantly regarded as an innovative governance method at the European Union
(EU) level facilitating bottom-up policy learning and strengthening the EU’s
social dimension through the regular exchange of information, deliberation,
policy evaluation and ‘naming and shaming’ between the Member States.
Academic interest in this phenomenon has been considerable and theoretical
* I would like to thank Dawid Friedrich, Traute Meyer, Jan-Henrik Meyer, the participants in the European
Social Policy workshop at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Nicosia, April 2006, particularly Karen Anderson,
Wolfram Lamping, Deborah Mabbett and Waltraud Schelkle, as well as the two anonymous referees for
very useful comments on previous versions of this article.
1 A significant component of the OMC, the European Employment Strategy, was launched at the Luxem-
bourg summit in November 1997.
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articles, as well as empirical evaluations of various OMC aspects, are numer-
ous (for general overviews, see Büchs, 2007; Zeitlin et al., 2005).
Recently, the interest in legitimacy issues regarding the OMC has also
increased, which is evident in the writings of Benz (2007), Borrás and
Conzelmann (2007), Duina and Raunio (2007), Hatzopoulos (2007), Kröger
(2007), Papadopoulos (2007), Radulova (2007), Wincott (2006) and Tsaka-
tika (2007). Early OMC literature was relatively optimistic regarding both its
legitimacy and potential to increase the European Union’s democratic quality
(e.g. Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004; Gerstenberg and Sabel, 2002; Jacobsson
and Vifell, 2002). However, a number of more sceptical assessments of
the OMC’s legitimacy have since been published, in particular those of
Hatzopoulos (2007), Kröger (2007) and Tsakatika (2007).
This article charts the debate regarding the OMC’s legitimacy and demo-
cratic quality by applying the criteria of output- and input-legitimacy. This
distinction was developed by Scharpf during the 1970s (Scharpf, 1999, p. 6)
and is utilized here as it is generally a useful distinction for analysing issues
of legitimacy. It also had a significant impact on discussions regarding the
EU’s democracy deficit. However, this article employs a critical reading of
this distinction and argues that output-legitimacy alone is neither appropriate
nor can it be achieved without input-legitimacy. An analysis of input-
legitimacy within the OMC demonstrates that it primarily rests upon a model
of stakeholder participation. As this model and practice is problematic from
the perspective of representative-parliamentarian democracy, the article con-
cludes that the OMC’s legitimacy can only be strengthened by improving
parliamentary channels of input-legitimacy. The conclusion briefly discusses
a range of reform options.
I. Why Worry About the OMC’s Legitimacy?
Firstly, one must establish why one should be concerned with the OMC’s
legitimacy and democratic quality. The OMC objectives are adopted by the
Council of the European Union or the European Council whilst parliaments at
the EU and national levels play a merely marginal role in the process. From
a ‘formalistic’ or ‘legalistic’ perspective, one might argue that the OMC does
not raise any legitimacy issues. This position emphasizes that the OMC is
coherent with the EU’s principle of subsidiarity, which allows the EU to adopt
policies only if an issue cannot be adequately tackled at the Member State
level. This perspective states that the OMC objectives and recommendations
are not legally binding, and consequently, the EU does not interfere with
the Member States’ authority in the area of social policy (Borrás and
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Conzelmann, 2007, p. 533). According to this logic, a national policy reform
informed by the OMC must be perceived as a voluntary, and therefore legiti-
mate, act (Amitsis et al., 2003, p. 91). In addition, this position argues that
important branches of the OMC, such as the European Employment Strategy
and processes of economic policy co-ordination, are legitimized through
Articles 99 and 125–30 of the Treaty establishing the European Communities.2
A number of difficulties are inherent within this ‘formalistic’ approach,
however. The OMC does not merely comprise minor or uncontroversial
‘technical details’, but promotes social policy approaches associated with
fundamental values and interests (Borrás and Conzelmann, 2007, p. 532;
Kröger, 2007, p. 579). Although numerous authors agree that the OMC is
unlikely to affect national policy-making directly, it is becoming increasingly
accepted that it may have long-term effects upon Member States’ social
policies through framing the perception and definition of problems, as well as
related policy responses (e.g. Hatzopoulos, 2007; López-Santana, 2006).
Whilst national parliaments still formally adopt social policies, the OMC
restricts their role as agenda-setters and strengthens executives’ influence
upon agenda-setting and policy-design. In addition, the European Social Fund
has been more closely linked to the OMC in recent years.3 Therefore, the
OMC has a potential impact upon the European Social Fund’s implementa-
tion and thus upon redistributive policies. Furthermore, some authors have
argued that the European Court of Justice is potentially able to refer to OMC
objectives in its decisions (Hatzopoulos, 2007, p. 335). These are indicators
that the OMC possibly exerts an influence upon fundamental social policy
decisions and hence requires legitimacy.
II. Why Apply Output- and Input-Legitimacy?
Any debate surrounding the democratic quality and legitimacy of certain
governance instruments must clarify its evaluation criteria. This article
applies those of output- and input-legitimacy, developed by Scharpf in the late
1970s (Scharpf, 1999, p. 6). These criteria are employed within this article as
they identify two interrelated, but analytically distinct, criteria of democratic
legitimacy which had a significant impact upon the debate regarding the EU’s
legitimacy. However, as this discussion will demonstrate, the distinction
between output- and input-legitimacy has been applied in a problematic way
2 Currently, the OMC in areas such as social inclusion, social protection and health has no treaty basis
which could be criticized by the ‘formalist’ position. If the new reform treaty is ratified, this situation will
be rectified (see the text of the Draft Reform Treaty on «http://consilium.europa.eu/»).
3 See the new regulation on the European Social fund (EP/Council, 2006), preamble paragraphs 7, 13, 15,
Article 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5.
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within the debate surrounding the EU’s legitimacy, as well as, to a certain
degree, that of the OMC.
According to Scharpf (1999), policies are output-legitimate when they
produce outcomes serving the interests of the citizens, that is they are legiti-
mate because they are effective (‘politics for the people’). Policies are input-
legitimate when they reflect the citizens’ will that is usually provided for by
procedural arrangements related to majority rule (‘politics by the people’)
(Scharpf, 1999, p. 6). Scharpf maintains that input-legitimacy requires citi-
zens to possess a common political identity in order for input-legitimate
processes to generate the required trust that policy outputs are related not
merely to the aggregation of self-interested preferences but pursue a
‘common good’ (Scharpf, 1999, p. 7). In contrast, output-legitimacy can be
generated without such common political identity, as political decisions must
effectively solve problems and thereby fulfil the citizens’ interests. Scharpf
states that output- and input-legitimacy usually co-depend on one another at
the national level; effective national policies can be legitimate only when they
are based upon input-legitimate policy processes whilst input-legitimate
policies need to be effective to be fully legitimate (Scharpf, 1999, p. 26).
The concepts of ‘output’ and ‘input-legitimacy’ have also been applied to
discussions regarding the EU’s legitimacy and democratic quality. Within this
field, one influential perspective argues that the EU’s legitimacy must prima-
rily rely upon output-legitimacy since it is neither possible, necessary nor
desirable to generate input-legitimacy.
Scharpf, for instance, maintains that it is impossible to promote input-
legitimacy at the EU level, for example, through a powerful role for the
European Parliament in EU policy-making, EU party politics and the election
of an EU government, as a common political identity among EU citizens is
lacking. Scharpf thus argues that EU policies must be restricted to uncontro-
versial policy areas so that a political consensus fulfilling EU citizens’ inter-
ests can be reached and, consequently, no input-legitimate policy-making
processes are required (Scharpf, 1999, p. 22).
Authors such as Majone and Moravcsik also support the view that EU
policies should rely upon output-legitimacy (Majone, 1998; Moravcsik,
2002). They argue that input-legitimate institutions within the EU are unnec-
essary as the EU is primarily engaged with regulatory policies without redis-
tributive effects (Majone, 1998) and that the EU’s institutional system already
provides for accountable, transparent and median-voter-oriented policies
(Moravcsik, 2002). Furthermore, both Majone and Moravcsik believe that
input-legitimacy at the EU level is undesirable since a parliamentarization –
and politicization – of the EU would result in ineffective policy processes and
suboptimal policy outcomes (Follesdal and Hix, 2005, p. 7).
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This approach has been applied to the OMC by authors such as Telò
(2003), who argues that the OMC could be legitimized through its effective-
ness. To evaluate this claim, the following section briefly examines the
OMC’s effectiveness to investigate whether it has the potential to generate
output-legitimacy. Subsequently, the discussion will surpass questions
regarding the OMC’s effectiveness to scrutinize the appropriateness of
assumptions that it could be legitimized solely on the basis of its outcomes.
This will finally lead to an examination of the OMC’s input-legitimacy.
III. The OMC’s Output-Legitimacy
How Effective is the OMC?
To date, no clear consensus exists regarding the OMC’s effectiveness. This is
partly due to a lack of consistent evidence concerning the OMC’s influence
upon national policy-making, and partly related to disagreement surrounding
the definition of the OMC’s goals. Thus far, the majority of authors concede
that whilst a direct influence of the OMC upon national policy-making is
unlikely, it has the potential to ‘frame’ national policy-making indirectly and
generate long-term effects on policies through cross-national learning
(López-Santana, 2006; Trubek and Trubek, 2005; Zeitlin, 2005). Authors
believing that the OMC’s primary aim lies in facilitating the exchange of
information and providing an opportunity for informal policy-learning may
therefore conclude that this objective is fulfilled and the OMC consequently
passes the effectiveness test.
However, if the OMC’s effectiveness is evaluated against more ambitious
targets, the outcome may be less positive. This is likely to be the case if the
OMC is measured against its policy objectives and quantitative targets as well
as expectations that it has the potential to strengthen the EU’s social dimen-
sion and balance ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ integration (De la Porte and Pochet,
2002a, p. 11; European Council, 2000, para 15; Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000,
p. 278).
With an employment rate of 64.7 per cent for the EU-25 in 2006, signifi-
cant progress still has to be achieved if a target of 70 per cent is to be reached
by 2010.4 The ‘at-risk-of-poverty-rate’ in the EU-25, reflecting the proportion
of the population living on an income below 60 per cent of the median after
4 At first glance, the employment rate of 57.3 per cent for women in 2006 appears close to the goal of 60
per cent, which is to be achieved by 2010. However, the full-time equivalent rate for female employment
only reached 48.5 per cent in 2006. The employment rate for older workers was 43.6 per cent in 2006,
making the achievement of the goal of 50 per cent by 2010 unlikely, see Eurostat «http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu».
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social transfers, has stagnated at 16 per cent since the year 2000. Social
inequality, measured by the ratio of the income received by the top quintile to
the bottom quintile of the EU-25 population, has risen from 4.5 in 2000 to 4.9
in 2005. The Gini-coefficient, used as an indicator of income inequality
within the EU-25, has also increased from 29 to 30 between 2000 and 2005.5
This statistical evidence demonstrates that the OMC fails to achieve many of
its objectives, particularly those of ‘combating poverty and social exclusion’
(European Council, 2000, para 20). The mid-term review of the Lisbon
Strategy in 2005 also conceded that the OMC’s targets had not been
fully achieved, urging to overcome the ‘implementation deficit’ by 2010
(Commission, 2005, p. 13).
It has also become clear that the OMC has not changed the relationship
between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ integration (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000, p.
278; Scharpf, 1999, p. 45) as it did not affect the interpretation of how social
policy competencies are distributed between the EU and the Member States.
The EU’s social policy competencies remain constrained through strict appli-
cation of the subsidiarity principle. In addition, the OMC is embedded within
a framework of legally binding ‘negative integration’ policies as well as the
stability and growth pact which, although often criticized for being overly soft
and ineffective, continues to play a more significant role within national
policy debates and policy-making than the social policy OMC (De la Porte
and Pochet, 2002b, p. 51). The negative votes within the Dutch and French
referendums on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty also demonstrated that some
EU citizens tend to perceive the EU as a propellant for market liberalization
and potential threat to national social standards (Kenner, 2005, p. 542). This
evidence indicates that the OMC has not sufficiently contributed to strength-
ening the social dimension of the European Union. It is therefore questionable
whether the OMC possesses the ability to generate output-legitimacy, as it
lacks the required conditions.
Legitimizing the OMC Through its Effectiveness?
On a more fundamental level, one must discuss whether it would be appro-
priate to legitimize the OMC on the basis of its effectiveness. This section
considers significant theoretical concerns in relation to the perspective that
EU policies, and the OMC more specifically, can be predominantly legiti-
mized through outcomes. The latter position relies upon several precondi-
tions, including the existence of consensual policy solutions (Scharpf, 1999,
p. 22) rendering political debate and contestation unnecessary. If consensus
5 All data are sourced from the latest Eurostat figures, «http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu».
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exists prior to public discussion, policies can be defined by ‘agents’ such as
the European Commission or expert committees. A second precondition for
the legitimacy of delegating policy-making to non-democratic institutions is
that policy outcomes must have pareto-optimal effects, meaning that they
must benefit at least one person without disadvantaging any other individual
(Lord and Beetham, 2001). In other words, policies based upon output-
legitimacy must not have redistributive effects. If one scrutinizes the OMC
with regards to these two preconditions, it appears that both are far from being
fulfilled.
As previously mentioned, the OMC objectives, guidelines and recommen-
dations rely upon fundamental values and decisions regarding the direction
that European social policy should take (Borrás and Conzelmann, 2007). The
OMC objectives promote an agenda of market-enhancing financial sustain-
ability and welfare-to-work policies (Ashiagbor, 2005; Büchs, 2007). It
cannot be assumed that this policy approach is uncontroversial amongst EU
citizens and it is therefore not legitimate if decisions regarding these pro-
grammatic orientations are adopted in policy processes decoupled from open
parliamentary debate.
The position assuming that experts or politicians in non-democratic insti-
tutions are able to define social problems and corresponding policy solutions
fulfilling citizens’ long-term interests also disregards an important function of
democratic policy-making processes. For example, authors such as Habermas
(2001 [1998]) and Eriksen and Fossum (2000) argue that citizens’ interests do
not exist independently of public political discussion and cannot be objec-
tively identified by experts or political elites. They conversely assume that
citizens’ interests are formed only through public political deliberation,
which therefore emerges as a crucial element of any democratic policy-
making process. This appears to be an extremely valid argument, demonstrat-
ing the requirement for input-legitimacy in order to identify citizens’ interests.
Consequently, output-legitimacy alone is not only insufficient, but it cannot
be achieved without input-legitimacy.
In addition, the second precondition that the OMC can be based upon
output-legitimacy if its results are pareto-optimal, or have no redistributive
effects, does not appear to be fulfilled. As stated above, the OMC promotes
fundamental social policy concepts which, if influencing national policy-
making, affect the majority of the population. These policies will also barely
be pareto-optimal. For example, the European Employment Strategy and
OMC for social inclusion promote policies reducing ‘welfare dependency’ by
cutting benefits and imposing stricter conditionality upon the receipt of ben-
efits. Whilst such policies may have a positive effect upon overall employ-
ment rates, they may have a negative impact upon the well-being of benefit
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claimants and do not appear to contribute to greater social equality or poverty
reduction. This argument becomes even more relevant if one considers that
the OMC, and the European Employment Strategy in particular, has been
linked to the European Social Fund much more closely during recent years.6
Therefore, the EES potentially possesses concrete financial and (re)-
distributive effects. On a more abstract level, authors such as Lord and
Beetham (2001, p. 449) have argued that even if policies are pareto-optimal,
policy-makers must often choose between different pareto-optimal solutions
and consequently consensus upon the basis of this choice may not exist.
Furthermore, it is possible for the benefits of a specific pareto-optimal solu-
tion to be unevenly distributed (Schäfer, 2006, p. 194).
Two conclusions can be drawn from the debate regarding the OMC’s
effectiveness. Firstly, from experience of the initial ten years it is evident that
the OMC has not been effective in generating output-legitimacy as it has not
successfully strengthened the European Union’s social dimension. Secondly,
this article argues that even if it were effective, the OMC’s legitimacy cannot
solely rely upon output-legitimacy as this would be inappropriate. In addition,
output-legitimacy cannot be achieved without input-legitimacy since it is
impossible to identify citizens’ interests in isolation of input-legitimate
policy-making processes. The OMC therefore also requires input-legitimacy.
This dimension will be explored in the following section.
IV. The OMC’s Input-Legitimacy
Recently, various authors have highlighted a need for greater attention to be
attributed to the OMC’s input-legitimacy (Benz, 2007; Borrás and Conzel-
mann, 2007; Duina and Raunio, 2007; Hatzopoulos, 2007; Kröger, 2007;
Papadopoulos, 2007; Radulova, 2007; Tsakatika, 2007; Wincott, 2006).
Within this literature, however, different understandings of input-legitimacy
are employed (Borrás and Conzelmann, 2007; De la Porte and Nanz, 2004;
Kröger, 2007). I therefore propose contrasting representative-parliamentarian
and stakeholder-participation models of input-legitimacy. The representative-
parliamentarian model of input-legitimacy is orientated towards Scharpf’s
original notion of this term. According to this, input-legitimacy is generated
if the ‘will of the people’ is authentically expressed and directed into the
policy-making process, primarily through majoritarian parliamentary deci-
sions (Scharpf 1999, pp. 6 and 9). A second understanding of input-
legitimacy, employed in the OMC literature, assumes that political interests
are ideally directed into the policy-making process via a broad participatory
6 See footnote 3 above.
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model including not only citizens but also a variety of ‘stakeholders’ (Borrás
and Conzelmann, 2007, p. 542; De la Porte and Nanz, 2004, p. 272). This type
of participation can complement, and sometimes also replace, parliamentary
democracy.
First I argue that the EU provides for a stakeholder-participation model of
input-legitimacy within the OMC. I will subsequently explain the way in
which this model has been theoretically promoted by the concept of directly-
deliberative polyarchy (Cohen and Sabel, 1997; Dorf and Sabel, 1998; Eber-
lein and Kerwer, 2004; Gerstenberg and Sabel, 2002; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007;
Smismans, 2005). In addition, I will examine the participatory practices
within the OMC to investigate whether standards set by the EU are achieved.
Finally, I will discuss the appropriateness of directly-deliberative polyarchy
in legitimizing the OMC.
Stakeholder Participation Within the OMC
The EU has presented the OMC as a governance tool open for broad direct
participation of stakeholders such as interest groups, NGOs, regional and
local authorities and experts (see Commission, 2001, pp. 10 and 22; European
Council, 1997, para 14). According to the EU Commission and the Council,
national governments should consult these stakeholders and local or regional
authorities before OMC guidelines or objectives are adopted and, most sig-
nificantly, in drafting their ‘National Reform Programmes’ and ‘National
Strategic Reports’. In contrast to direct stakeholder participation, parliaments
at the EU and national levels play only a minor role within OMC processes
(Duina and Raunio, 2007; Tsakatika, 2007; Zeitlin, 2005, p. 460).7
However, the model of stakeholder participation has clearly been per-
ceived as a positive feature of the OMC and as ‘one dimension of the whole
issue of accountability, democratization and legitimacy of the new mode of
governance’ (Radaelli, 2003, p. 59). Direct stakeholder participation has also
been strongly supported by proponents of a new democracy model referred to
as directly-deliberative polyarchy (Cohen and Sabel, 1997; Dorf and Sabel,
1998; Gerstenberg and Sabel, 2002; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007).
Proponents of directly-deliberative polyarchy emphasize the OMC’s
potential to provide a blueprint for a new model of EU democracy and are
therefore optimistic that the OMC could contribute to an enhanced quality of
7 Duina and Rauino (2007) promote a more balanced view of the relationship between the OMC and
national parliaments, arguing that the OMC provides an official tool for policy learning within national
parliaments. This view can be criticized from two perspectives, however. Firstly, it favours output-
legitimacy over input-legitimacy, and secondly it overlooks the fact that explicit discussion of the OMC in
national parliaments, which currently does not take place, would be a pre-condition for transparent and
politicized ‘policy learning’.
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democracy within the EU. Directly-deliberative polyarchy is perceived as an
alternative to representative and constitutional democracy (Cohen and Sabel,
1997; Dorf and Sabel, 1998; Gerstenberg and Sabel, 2002, p. 294). It essen-
tially argues that representative and constitutional democracy is no longer a
desirable and feasible model due to society’s increasing diversity and vola-
tility. Directly-deliberative polyarchy therefore proposes that decision-
making and implementation should be undertaken by local political units
whilst central administration, parliament and courts provide only the frame-
work for such decentralized decision-making and monitoring (Cohen and
Sabel, 1997; Dorf and Sabel, 1998; Gerstenberg and Sabel, 2002, p. 294). In
return for greater policy-making authority, local units must provide central
and higher level units with information regarding their solutions, experiences
and performance, which can then be disseminated and publicized to other
local units. Local policy-making is directly-deliberative, as a wide range of
political actors participate in local-decision-making through deliberation, or
the exchange of arguments mutually acknowledged as rational (Cohen and
Sabel, 1997, p. 320).
Directly-deliberative polyarchy assumes that policy solutions must be
found during the problem-solving process since the creation and implemen-
tation of regulations needs to be more flexible and responsive to rapidly
changing social contexts (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007, p. 37). Consequently,
rule-makers and rule-takers can no longer be clearly distinguished but mutu-
ally depend upon one another. Therefore, a strict separation of powers is not
feasible according to directly-deliberative polyarchy; decision-making and
implementation are merged within local units in which citizens, interest
groups as well as both private and voluntary organizations participate.
Directly-deliberative polyarchy also provides an alternative model of
accountability within the OMC. For instance, Sabel and Zeitlin (2007) argue
that whilst the OMC does not fulfil traditional criteria of hierarchical
principal-agent accountability, it does provide for horizontal ‘dynamic
accountability’ through peer review. The concept of horizontal, dynamic
accountability is based upon the notion that in situations where ‘actors [. . .]
learn what problem they are solving, and what solution they are seeking,
through the very process of problem solving’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007, p. 37),
accountability is not about compliance by the agent to the principle’s rules but
lies in the mutual and deliberative control between actors in networks (see
also Tsakatika, 2007, p. 555).
From this review of EU standards regarding OMC participation, as well as
the model of directly-deliberative polyarchy, one must firstly question
whether these standards are fulfilled and how the model of participation
within the OMC can be assessed. Secondly, one must discuss whether
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directly-deliberative polyarchy is an appropriate model for legitimizing
the OMC.
Assessing Participation and Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy
In order to assess the appropriateness of the stakeholder-participation model
of input-legitimacy in legitimizing the OMC, I will firstly review the available
evidence regarding the current practice of participation in OMC processes.
At the European level, ‘stakeholder’ participation differs between the
European Employment Strategy (EES) and the OMC in social inclusion and
protection. Article 128 of the Treaty of the European Communities requires
the Council to consult the Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions before the employment guidelines are adopted. More
informally, the European social partner organizations, such as the European
Trade Union Confederation and the Union des Industries de la Communauté
Européenne (UNICE), are also consulted in EES matters and some authors
maintain that their right to consultation can be derived from Article 130 of the
Treaty (De la Porte and Pochet, 2005, p. 363). For the OMC in social
inclusion and protection, no such treaty provisions exist regarding the con-
sultation of stakeholders. However, several European organizations in the
area of anti-poverty policy, such as the European Anti-Poverty Network, are
informally consulted and issue opinions regarding the OMC. No clear rules
exist regarding which European non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
should be consulted and the risk that some may be sidelined in this process
prevails (De la Porte and Pochet, 2005, p. 376). In addition, the Employment
and Social Protection Committees, which play an important role in formu-
lating OMC objectives and developing quantitative indicators, regularly invite
experts and other actors for consultation (De la Porte and Pochet, 2005,
p. 375). However, the actors that are consulted as well as the exact role that
they play remain opaque (Berghman and Okma, 2002).
At the national level, an increasing amount of empirical data regarding the
participation of stakeholders within the OMC exists, although it remains
incomplete. A number of general conclusions have been drawn within pub-
lications by authors such as de la Porte and Pochet (2005), Zeitlin (2005) and
Friedrich (2006). They concur that overall, stakeholder participation within
the OMC has increased. Within the OMC for social inclusion and protection,
NGOs possess a more significant role than social partners, whilst the opposite
is true for the European Employment Strategy (De la Porte and Pochet, 2005).
This is predominantly explained by the fact that as employment policy is
dominated by the social partners, both governments and they themselves
oppose closer participation by NGOs in that area. In addition, the OMC for
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social inclusion and protection only partially overlaps with social partners’
remits, resulting in insufficient incentives to participate in these branches of
the OMC. Authors such as de la Porte and Pochet (2005, p. 382) and Casey
(2005) have noted that the overall level of participation by social partners
remains less significant than expected. One explanation for this phenomenon
is that social partners are intrinsically ambivalent regarding the European
Employment Strategy, since it does not fully support their political interests
(De la Porte and Pochet, 2005, p. 369). In contrast, NGOs are generally less
established policy actors at the national level. The OMC therefore provides a
potential channel through which to express their views (De la Porte and
Pochet, 2005, p. 383). In some countries, new consultation forums have been
developed with regards to the OMC, strengthening communication between
the government and NGOs and/or social partners (Zeitlin, 2005, p. 462). In a
number of countries, regional and local authorities are also increasingly
consulted regarding OMC processes. Zeitlin (2005, p. 469), for instance,
assumes that they have pressed for the possibility of participation in countries
where their autonomy is more contested, whilst they have been more sceptical
regarding the OMC in countries in which they possess entrenched authorities.
Overall, stakeholder participation in national OMC processes has not fully
fulfilled initial expectations and remains uneven between countries. The latter
applies both to the level of participation as well as the ways in which
stakeholders are allowed to influence OMC processes.8 The level and type of
actor participation has also changed considerably over time in certain coun-
tries, leading to an inability to identify regular patterns (Kröger, 2007).
Several authors also report incidences of governments rejecting requests by
certain stakeholders to participate (De la Porte and Pochet, 2005; Jacobsson,
2005, p. 117; Kröger, 2007).
A significant criticism of the current model of OMC participation refers to
the marginalization of parliaments at the EU and national levels in the
process. According to Article 128 of the Treaty of the European Communi-
ties, the European Parliament must be consulted regarding the guidelines of
the European Employment Strategy, whilst no such rules exist in relation to
other social policy strands of the OMC. However, a study by Tsakatika (2007,
p. 553) concludes that the involvement of the European Parliament in OMC
processes has increased over the years, particularly since the mid-term review
of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 in which the Commission called for more
active input by the European Parliament to the Commission’s annual strategic
report (Tsakatika, 2007, p. 552). In November 2004, a group comprised of 33
8 For example, in some countries social partners and/or regional authorities draft sections of the National
Reform Programmes, in others they are merely consulted.
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members of the European Parliament covering all standing groups was estab-
lished to review issues related to the Lisbon Strategy (Tsakatika, 2007,
p. 553). This group drafts an annual resolution on the Lisbon Agenda which
is debated and adopted by the plenary and within joint parliamentary meet-
ings between members from the European and national parliaments before
being sent to the Spring Council (Tsakatika, 2007, p. 553). Although this
development represents a stronger role for the European Parliament in the
Lisbon Strategy, more empirical analysis is required in order to examine
whether the social policy OMCs are as significant within the European Par-
liament’s discussion and resolution as the internal market aspects of the
Lisbon Strategy and how Member State representatives respond to the reso-
lution’s social policy aspects at the Spring Summits.
Many authors also conclude from the empirical evidence that national
parliaments remain marginalized within national OMC processes since only
few countries involve them in the creation of National Reform Programmes
(De la Porte and Pochet, 2005; Duina and Raunio, 2007; Friedrich, 2006;
Kröger, 2007; Tsakatika, 2007). Tsakatika (2007, p. 552) concludes from a
comparative analysis of Member States’ parliamentary involvement within
OMC processes that in 2006, the Lisbon Strategy was debated in national
parliaments’ plenaries or committees in only two Member States, the United
Kingdom and Belgium. In all other Member States, parliamentary input into
the Lisbon process was rated at a very low level and in nine of all 25 Member
States, national parliaments were not even involved at committee level
(Tsakatika, 2007, p. 553).
This evidence demonstrates that participation within OMC processes is
based upon an input-legitimacy model of stakeholder participation rather
than a representative-parliamentarian model. From the perspective of
representative-parliamentarian input-legitimacy, a number of problems exist
with the current model of OMC participation. Firstly, no clear criteria are
established at the EU level regarding which actors should participate in the
development of OMC objectives or national reform programmes. Guidelines
regarding the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders participating in OMC
processes are also absent from this process.
One can therefore argue that current arrangements for stakeholder partici-
pation within the OMC are detrimental to the OMC’s transparency and
accountability. In general, Member State citizens are not well informed
regarding OMC processes or the roles played by different institutions and
actors at the EU and national levels within the OMC. The majority of EU
citizens are furthermore unaware that the OMC and Lisbon strategy even exist
(European Commission, 2006, p. 14). A significant illustration of the OMC’s
opaqueness at the EU level is evident within participation in the Employment
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and Social Protection Committees. Both are crucial in developing quantitative
indicators as well as discussing proposals for guidelines and objectives. The
Committees may consult experts, interest groups and voluntary organizations.
However, no clear rules exist to govern these consultations and meeting
minutes are not publicly available. Therefore, stakeholder and experts’ influ-
ence upon OMC indicators and objectives remains unclear.
The OMC is not only opaque in terms of stakeholder participation but also
at a more general level concerning the role of national governments in OMC
negotiations. As the minutes of Council discussions are not publicly available,
no transparency exists with regards to the positions taken by government
representatives. National citizens are therefore unable to reveal the role that
their, and other Member State, governments have played in OMC decisions.
This weakens the accountability of national governments to their parliaments
and electorates. This accountability is further weakened by the fact that there
is very little media and parliamentary debate regarding the OMC. Potentially,
executives are able to employ the OMC in order to pressure for unpopular
policy change at the national level,9 whilst the role played by governments in
EU level OMC negotiations remains opaque to national electorates (Büchs,
2008).
Furthermore, it remains questionable exactly how input-legitimacy orien-
tated the stakeholder participation model is, as one of its aims appears to be
the development of more effective policies. For example, the logic behind this
model becomes evident within the Commission’s White Paper on Gover-
nance, according to which stakeholder participation shall enhance the pros-
pects for ‘effective’ policies (Commission, 2001, p. 10). The underlying
logic implies that policies will be more effectively implemented if stake-
holder interests are acknowledged in the early stages of the policy-making
process.
Generally, direct participation of stakeholders and local or regional
authorities within policy-making does not increase representative-
parliamentarian input-legitimacy as these actors do not represent the ‘will’ of
the electorate but specific, partially ‘private’ interests. Furthermore, direct
stakeholder participation is likely to privilege actors able to organize them-
selves and express a shared interest, as well as those important to policy
implementation. This may, however, occur at the expense of third parties who
are affected by the policies but are not directly responsible for their
implementation. Direct participation of selected civil society actors can,
9 Whilst this might not be the default mode of OMC usage at the domestic level, there is evidence that some
governments use the OMC in this way, for instance in Germany (Büchs, 2008), the Netherlands (Visser,
2005, p. 199) and France (Erhel et al., 2005, p. 217).
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therefore, even impede the enhancement of representative-parliamentarian
input-legitimacy.
However, some authors have argued that a representative-parliamentarian
model of democracy is no longer feasible, promoting the notion that the OMC
could instead be legitimized by the alternative model of directly-deliberative
polyarchy. Some proponents of directly-deliberative polyarchy have stated
that the OMC has thus far been unable to achieve this ideal (Smismans, 2005).
Nonetheless, assuming that this model has the potential to be realized, one
must discuss whether it would be an appropriate model for legitimizing
the OMC.
The model of directly-deliberative polyarchy certainly addresses some
important concerns regarding the viability of representative-parliamentarian
democracy. However, a number of weaknesses are inherent within this
model, leading one to conclude that it is inadequate to legitimize the
OMC.10 Firstly, directly-deliberative polyarchy appears to underestimate
power-asymmetries between citizens and various societal groups regarding
participation in local policy-making. The model suggests that citizens, inter-
est groups, private and voluntary organizations and NGOs possess equal
influence upon local policy-making. The underlying assumption of this
model perceives different actors as dependent upon one another in such a
way that all participants are essentially equal, resulting in policies that
equally serve the interests and needs of all participants (Gerstenberg and
Sabel, 2002, p. 293). However, this is an idealistic belief, since it is highly
likely that local actors are diversely dependent upon one another, possessing
differing capabilities and abilities to organize themselves and influence
policies, and that power asymmetries between local actors therefore inevi-
tably exist. This is particularly the case in the area of social policy, which
has potentially redistributive consequences.
Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether the traditional model of the
separation of powers should be replaced by a model of horizontal or ‘dynamic
accountability’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007). Even if it can probably never be
fully realized, the principle of the separation of powers in parliamentary
democracies is crucial. It serves the inhibition of authoritarianism and
monopolization of power by preventing rule-makers from creating self-
serving rules unresponsive to requirements of the ‘common good’ or will of
citizens. ‘Hierarchical’ accountability of governments to parliaments and
parliaments to the general electorate based upon the principle of separation of
powers still appears to be the most convincing and effective method of
preventing the misuse of political power by powerful groups in society.
10 See also Scheuermann (2004) for a critical debate of directly-deliberative polyarchy.
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Finally, directly-deliberative polyarchy promotes the localization of policy-
making and implementation, maintaining that it is the most effective way of
generating locally tailored solutions through the direct involvement of local
actors affected by the adopted policies. However, certain problems require
national or supranational policies in order to avoid negative effects of policies
in one local unit upon another or a ‘race-to-the-bottom’. Social and environ-
mental standards provide good examples of this issue. In addition, localiza-
tion of social policies potentially contrasts with equal rights deriving from
social citizenship if it produces a diversification of available policies and
access to services. Regional inequalities are particularly likely to increase if
local units endure the full financial responsibilities of their policies and if the
national or supranational level does not provide for redistribution between
poorer and richer regions.
Overall, it therefore appears that the model of directly-deliberative
polyarchy does not provide a convincing model for conceptualizing the
OMC’s input-legitimacy.
Conclusion
This article argued that the OMC’s legitimacy and democratic quality are
deficient in terms of both output- and input-legitimacy. Upon initial assess-
ment, the OMC does not appear to possess the ability to generate output-
legitimacy since it is not sufficiently effective. In particular, its broader goals
of strengthening the EU’s social dimension, combating poverty and social
exclusion and balancing ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ integration have not been
achieved. However, even if the OMC were more effective, a number of
criticisms regarding claims that it could be legitimized solely on the basis of
its outputs would remain. These concerns primarily surround the fact that its
objectives are not consensual and may have (re)distributive effects. Contro-
versial policies with (re)distributive effects must also have their basis in
input-legitimacy; output-legitimacy alone remains insufficient. In addition,
input-legitimacy is required in order to achieve output-legitimacy, as citizens’
interests cannot be defined in isolation of input-legitimate policy-making
processes.
It is therefore necessary to also analyse the OMC’s input-legitimacy. This
examination demonstrated that a model of direct stakeholder participation is
currently in use as opposed to provisions for representative-parliamentarian
input-legitimacy. Several problems were identified with this approach. Stake-
holder participation remains inconsistent and creates problems in terms of
both transparency and accountability.
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An underlying difficulty is also evident in the absence of clear rules
regarding the level and type of stakeholder participation. One may also
conclude that the model of directly-deliberative polyarchy fails to provide a
convincing alternative that could legitimize the stakeholder-participation
model of input-legitimacy within the OMC.
This article therefore argues that the current stakeholder model of partici-
pation not only marginalizes parliaments at the EU and national levels but is
also detrimental to national parliamentary democracy more generally as it
strengthens executives whilst weakening parliamentary power in national
policy-making processes. It is thus crucial to strengthen representative-
parliamentarian input-legitimacy both within the OMC and at the national
level. It is consequently imperative to examine whether, and if so, how, this
could be achieved.
One radical proposal is the abolishment of the OMC, as it is not suffi-
ciently effective in strengthening a social Europe whilst it informally influ-
ences national policy-making and therefore raises legitimacy concerns. One
alternative would be to leave responsibility for social policy with the Member
States and ‘re-parliamentarize’ them. However, this is not a preferable option
since social policies must be co-ordinated at the EU level to strengthen the
social dimension of the common market.
Another radical reform option that has been discussed, originally by
Scharpf (2002), is to adopt a set of general but legally binding OMC objec-
tives through the co-decision procedure of the Council and European Parlia-
ment. Member State governments would be obliged to implement these
‘framework directives’ whilst retaining reasonable discretion regarding the
concrete measures adopted. Whilst this proposal promises to be the most
effective and legitimate option if it were workable, it is currently the least
probable scenario since it is highly unlikely that the 27 Member State gov-
ernments would be able to agree consensually upon any binding framework
directives.
A range of further proposals can alternatively be made to improve the
OMC’s transparency, accountability and input-legitimacy. For instance, even
if OMC objectives are adopted as non-binding guidelines, the European
Parliament could have the right of co-decision in the decision-making
process. In the joint parliamentary sessions between the European and
national parliaments, coverage of the social policy OMCs should be ensured
so that both levels have an input upon OMC objectives. These measures
would enhance the OMC’s publicity and enable open political discussion of
its objectives.
Much more detailed information should be made available of Council
discussions preceding the adoption of OMC objectives, ideally in form of
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discussion transcripts similar to those of second chamber parliamentary dis-
cussions at the national level, in order to strengthen the transparency and
accountability of national ministers to their parliaments and electorates. This
should also apply to discussions of the Social Protection and Employment
Committees, as they undertake crucial decisions concerning quantitative indi-
cators and targets within the OMC.
Moreover, whilst the current situation provides no political consensus for
rendering OMC objectives legally binding, much clearer and potentially
legally binding rules should exist regarding the decision-making procedures
of OMC objectives at the EU, as well as national levels. For example, national
governments could be required to consult with national parliaments before
the objectives and guidelines are adopted at the EU level. National govern-
ments could also be required to establish clear rules, according to national
traditions, regarding the consultation with actors such as social partners,
NGOs, sub-national authorities and citizen forums. Furthermore, they should
be obliged to provide detailed and publicly accessible information concerning
the level and scope of stakeholder involvement. This may include information
regarding whether stakeholders were consulted or allowed to contribute to the
national reports or programmes and the ways in which governments are
obliged to respond to their proposals.
Another possibility for raising awareness of the OMC and making the
association between EU and national social policy-making more transparent
may be obliging national parliaments to discuss whether, and if so, how, these
objectives could be linked to national policy-making. This would provide a
basis for a public and transparent discussion regarding the connection
between EU social policies and national policy-making. The obligation for
this discussion does not imply that national parliaments must adopt the
objectives, as they could still be rejected once justifications are provided. This
process would limit the current dominance of executives in the OMC process
and also strengthen the legislative branch of policy-making.
These proposed reform options remain inconclusive and are primarily
intended to instigate discussion. Solutions must be found that strengthen the
required representative-parliamentarian channel of OMC input-legitimacy
and prevent it being replaced by a stakeholder-participation model. This
would also serve to strengthen parliamentary democracy at the national
level.
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